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Scope is There for Modernization?
Ulrich Quack, James Burling, John Ratliff, Antonio Capobianco, Suyong Kim,
and William Kolasky

Abstract

On 30 September 2004, Wilmer Cutler Pickering Hale and Dorr LLP, the University of Nyenrode, and Global Competition Review co-sponsored a seminar on
the reform of Article 82 EC by the European Commission. The seminar raised
a great deal of interest amongst members of the legal community and attracted a
large attendance. The speakers included some of the most well-known top-level
policy makers, academics, and practitioners in the ?eld of competition law. Over
the last two years, there have been numerous calls for modernization of the way
in which Article 82 of the EC Treaty is applied by the European Commission and,
with decentralization in mind, by 25 national competition authorities and many
more national courts. Modernization in other areas has involved a greater focus
on the economic effects of the relevant practice. In Article 82 EC cases, enforcement has, however, been more based on the perceived object of a criticized practice with the effect being inferred from market power. Classic positions on ?delity
market power. Classic positions on ?delity rebates and the special responsibilities
of dominant companies have also been reaf?rmed recently by the European Court
in judgments such as Michelin II, Masterfoods II, and BA/Virgin. The aim of the
seminar was to look at the concepts underlying the current law in relation to rebates and tying and bundling to compare how EU and US enforcers deal with such
issues and to make suggestions for possible European Commission guidelines on
Article 82 EC enforcement practice.
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On 30 September 2004, Wilmer Cutler
Pickering Hale and Dorr LLP, the University of Nyenrode, and Global Competition
Review co-sponsored a seminar on the reform of
Article 82 EC by the European Commission. The
seminar raised a great deal of interest amongst
members of the legal community and attracted
a large attendance. The speakers included some
of the most well-known top-level policy makers,
academics, and practitioners in the ﬁeld of competition law.
Over the last two years, there have been
numerous calls for modernization of the way in
which Article 82 of the EC Treaty is applied by the
European Commission and, with decentralization
in mind, by 25 national competition authorities
and many more national courts. Modernization
in other areas has involved a greater focus on
the economic effects of the relevant practice. In
Article 82 EC cases, enforcement has, however,
been more based on the perceived object of a
criticized practice with the effect being inferred
from market power. Classic positions on ﬁdelity

rebates and the special responsibilities of dominant
companies have also been reafﬁrmed recently by
the European Court in judgments such as Michelin
II, Masterfoods II, and BA/Virgin. The aim of the
seminar was to look at the concepts underlying
the current law in relation to rebates and tying and
bundling to compare how EU and US enforcers
deal with such issues and to make suggestions
for possible European Commission guidelines on
Article 82 EC enforcement practice.
Claus-Dieter Ehlermann (senior counsel,
Wilmer Cutler Pickering Hale and Dorr LLP)
introduced the proceedings. After welcoming all
the speakers and participants, he drew attention
to the importance of a reform which, ﬁrst and
foremost, deﬁnes what is the “object and purpose”
which Article 82 EC pursues and then sets the rules
through which this object and purpose is to be
achieved. He pleaded for these rules to be based
on economic effects rather than form and stressed
that any new guideline on the enforcement of Article 82 EC should provide enforcers, companies,
and practitioners with a “practicable test.” Clear

WILMER CUTLER PICKERING H ALE AND DORR LLP
This letter is for general informational purposes only and does not represent our legal advice as to any particular set of facts, nor does this letter represent any
undertaking to keep recipients advised as to all relevant legal developments. © 2004 WILMER CUTLER PICKERING H ALE AND DORR LLP

Hosted by The Berkeley Electronic Press

and “Should economic effects take a role in the
Commission’s analysis of unilateral conduct?”.
Some of these questions may currently involve
conﬂicting answers because the legal standard applied is sometimes problematic if looked at from
an economic perspective. He suggested that the
reform should rest on two core ideas: no conduct
should be considered per se abusive and an effectsbased standard should rely on workable economic
rules of thumb and guidelines.

objectives and practicable tests do not necessarily
mean that all per se rules or (rebuttable) presumptions should be banned and replaced by economic
analysis of each individual case.
The seminar was organized into ﬁve panel
discussions.

Article 82 EC:
The Current Law and Practice
In the ﬁrst panel, John Ratliff (partner, Wilmer
Cutler Pickering Hale and Dorr LLP) and Derek
Ridyard (partner, RBB Economics) outlined the
legal and economic principles underpinning the
current enforcement of Article 82 EC.

Rebates after Michelin II
and BA/Virgin
The second panel was chaired by Michel
Waelbroeck (Emeritus Professor of European
Law, Université Libre de Bruxelles and President
of the Belgian Competition Commission). He
opened the discussion on rebates with an overview
of the case-law of the European courts in this
area. He took the view that currently there is very
little room left for dominant companies wishing
to implement a rebate scheme and that he did not
expect the Commission to depart considerably
from this position, which has been endorsed in its
entirety by the European courts.

John Ratliff gave an overview of the legal
principles and introduced some of the themes
that would be discussed later in the day, such
as the (currently) underestimated importance of
buyer power in assessing dominance and abusive
conduct; the extreme difﬁculty in distinguishing
between anti-competitive (exclusionary) practices
and normal competition; the unsatisfactory approach to what a dominant ﬁrm can do to respond
to competitive pressure; and the need to balance
more economic analysis while not depriving
companies of predictability and legal certainty.
He concluded by laying the ground for the discussion on what could be a roadmap for reform. He
suggested that the European Commission might
distinguish between practices which are clearly not
abusive, practices which are presumptively abusive (e.g. because of market foreclosing effects,
but which may be allowed if they have proven
positive effects) and “hardcore” abuses.

Doug Melamed (partner, Wilmer Cutler
Pickering Hale and Dorr LLP) discussed the current status of the US law on single and bundled
rebates, stressing the different approach that US
agencies have to rebates compared to their European colleagues. Under US law, he explained
that single product rebates are not perceived as a
concern if the price remains above costs. He then
discussed the recent judgment in LaPage vs 3M,
where multi-product discounts were considered
illegal, even if above costs. He considered that,
overall, the opinion in LaPage reﬂected concerns
that are more common in the EU, such as a sense
of unfairness when a big or multi-product ﬁrm
seeks to exploit its advantages to the detriment of
smaller rivals.

Derek Ridyard discussed seven key questions
which in his opinion should be addressed by the
European Commission in the reform: “Should
there be per se abusive practices?”; “Can there
be an abuse at a threshold below the predation
standard?”; “What is a cost (or other “objective”)
justiﬁcation?”; “What is an essential facility?”;
“When are bundling and tying really abusive?”;
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Following on the legal discussion on bundled
discounts, David Sibley (Deputy Assistant At-
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torney General, Antitrust Division, Department of
Justice) proposed a test which he thought might
offer a workable approach to distinguishing competitive from anti-competitive bundled discounts.
His proposal, which he stressed was not representative of the DOJ position, was to compare the
bundled price with the stand-alone price of the
monopoly product, before the bundling strategy.
If the stand-alone price of the monopoly product
equals the monopoly price, consumer welfare of
the ﬁrm’s customers over both the monopoly product and the bundled products is higher than under
independent pricing. If the stand-alone price of
the monopoly product is higher than the monopoly
price, consumer welfare over all products falls.

courts on rebates may be justiﬁed by the protection of interests other than an efﬁcient allocation
of resources. For instance, antitrust agencies may
also have an institutional interest in preserving
equal opportunities to compete for all the market
players. He concluded by saying that the political
framework of any reform of Article 82 EC should
clarify the factors which should be taken into account, efﬁciencies being only one of them.

Tying and Bundling –
from Hilti to Microsoft
The third panel was chaired by Walter van
Gerven (Emeritus Professor, Katholieke Universiteit Leuven, former Advocate General at the
European Court of Justice). The forum offered
a lively debate between Alex Burnside (partner,
Linklaters) and Martin Bechtold (partner, Clifford Chance) on the Microsoft decision, with
each person advocating one side of the case. The
panelists did not contest the appropriateness of
the test applied by the European Commission in
ﬁnding an abusive tying by Microsoft, but rather
focused on whether the decision was sufﬁciently
grounded on the facts.

Patrick Rey (Professor of Economics, Institute for Industrial Economics, Toulouse) discussed
the economic motivations underpinning the policy
on rebates. He distinguished between efﬁciency
motivations and anti-competitive motivations.
The ﬁrst set of motivations includes so-called
“Ramsey” pricing (i.e., lowering margins on more
elastic demand segments), the manufacturer’s goal
of providing incentives to retailers and the need of
the manufacturer to meet competition. The second
set of motivations relates to foreclosure and predation. Since some of the rebate schemes may at
the same time generate efﬁciencies and have some
foreclosure effect, he suggested that antitrust enforcers in Europe should move from a form-based
to an effect-based approach which is better suited
to balance the pro- and anti-competitive effects of
such conduct. In order to do so, when reviewing
rebate schemes, antitrust agencies should address
the following issues: “Has there been an exclusionary effect?”; “Are there signiﬁcant efﬁciencies?”;
and “Are consumers likely to be harmed?”.

The stage was then taken by Barry Nalebuff
(Adjunct Professor of Law, Yale Law School) who
gave a presentation on tying and bundling in EC
and US law. He pointed out that the enforcement
of Article 82 EC is much inﬂuenced by the purpose of protecting the market from unfair trading
practices. He then discussed the approach of US
and EC antitrust enforcers towards monopoly
leveraging, bundling and tying.
The panel discussion was concluded by a
presentation from John Thorne (Senior Vice
President and Deputy General Counsel, Verizon)
on bundling after the LaPage vs 3M judgment in
the US. Mr. Thorne expressed the US industry
criticisms of the judgment saying it introduced
uncertainty in this area of law and that this uncertainty could lead to undesired consequences as it
might deter price cutting through rebates by domi-

The panel discussion was concluded by Frédéric Jenny (Vice-President, French Conseil de
la Concurrence) who suggested that efﬁciencies
may not be the only factor that antitrust enforcers
do (or should) take into consideration when looking at rebates and discounts. He observed that
the criticized recent judgments of the European
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nant ﬁrms. He suggested that bundled discounts
should be allowed and that courts should recognize
that they are not well suited to distinguishing
beneﬁcial versus anti-competitive bundles, as this
involves setting and monitoring costs, pricing and
quantity levels. On a question from the audience,
Mr. Thorne also expressed concerns that the legal
uncertainty on bundled discounts could lead to an
increase in the number of private actions against
virtually all American industries as bundled discounts are ubiquitous.

Commission is determined to commit the necessary
“R&D effort” in this area and is aware that this may
entail a revision of the European Commission’s
current approach as also endorsed by the European
courts. Mr. Buigues conﬁrmed that the European
Commission is prepared to move away from a
legalistic and formalistic approach in favour of enforcement based more on economic principles. This
means that the focus of enforcement will be on the
effects and not just on the nature of the conduct.
According to both Mr. Paulis and Mr. Buigues,
the guiding principles for drafting the guidelines
will be “consumer welfare” and “competition on the
merits.” These principles will have to be properly
deﬁned, but it is already clear that they will not only
be applicable to dominant ﬁrms but to all players
equally (i.e., dominant ﬁrms must be allowed to
compete on the merits, but must also be prevented
from limiting other ﬁrms’ ability to compete on the
merits). It is still an open question if the fact that
conduct is capable of having exclusionary effects is
a sufﬁcient standard for ﬁnding an abuse. Further
clariﬁcations will be needed in this respect, for
instance, should the negative effects on consumers
be actual or just likely and should the competitive
harm to consumers be direct or does indirect harm
also sufﬁce.

What Scope is there for Modernizing
Article 82 EC Abuse Practice?
The fourth panel and ﬁrst afternoon session
was chaired by Sir Christopher Bellamy QC
(President, UK Competition Appeal Tribunal,
former judge at the European Court of First Instance) who stressed the importance of courts in
the enforcement of competition rules and that the
reform of Article 82 EC will have to provide all
enforcers with a manageable number of clear legal
rules. This should not be at the expense of ﬂexibility and coherence with economic concepts.
The ﬁrst two panelists presented their personal
views on the modernization of Article 82 EC
from the perspective of the Commission. Emil
Paulis (Director, DG Competition, European
Commission) and Pierre Buigues (Deputy Chief
Economist, DG Competition, European Commission) conﬁrmed that the European Commission is
working on draft guidelines on the enforcement
of Article 82 EC. They stated this is a difﬁcult
and time-consuming process which will concern
both the concept of dominance and the concept
of abuse.

The Commission will also have to take a position on whether its assessment will take account of
long-term or just short-term considerations. Mr.
Buigues added that when assessing the impact of
conduct on consumers, the Commission may have
to look at factors other than price and quantity, such
as product quality and availability.
The guidelines will also touch upon the defenses
available to dominant ﬁrms. Both Mr. Paulis and
Mr. Buigues recognized that efﬁciencies will have to
be looked at more closely, but admitted that the balancing of efﬁciencies with the potential exclusionary effects of certain conduct is a difﬁcult task.

The purpose of the guidelines will be to offer
a comprehensive and systematic approach for
distinguishing between legal and illegal conduct.
This has become very important for two reasons:
facilitating consistency amongst enforcers and
fostering transparency and legal security for private companies. Mr. Paulis said that the European
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To a question by Claus-Dieter Ehlermann on
how the European Commission sees the allocation

4

http://law.bepress.com/wilmer/art43
WWW.WILMERHALE.COM

of the burden of proof in Article 82 EC cases, Mr.
Paulis replied that while the European Commission
will look at each case broadly, it is certainly up to
the European Commission to provide evidence of
the exclusionary effects of conduct and up to the
defendant to provide evidence of the countervailing factors, such as business justiﬁcations and
efﬁciencies.

The last panelist, Pieter Kuipers (Deputy
General Counsel - Europe, Unilever) welcomed
a review of Article 82 EC that would take into
account the changes in the economic reality of
European markets that have occurred since Article
82 EC was introduced by the Treaty of Rome. He
welcomed the fact that, when assessing dominance,
the European Commission would examine other
factors such as barriers to entry and not just rely on
market shares. He also pleaded in favor of a wider
recognition of buyer power, particularly at retail
level, as a factor negating dominance and noted
that countervailing buyer power has been taken
into account in many merger control cases.

Ulf Böge (President, Bundeskartellamt) suggested that the reform of Article 82 EC should
look at the conduct of companies in light of the
overall economic context; a test balancing proand anti-competitive aspects is required although
this may be difﬁcult in practice. Already today
the Bundeskartellamt is frequently engaged in
examining whether and to what extent efﬁciencies arise from a dominant company’s conduct in
individual cases. He concluded that the reform
should not only introduce more ﬂexible economic
rules, but should also strive to make abuse control
predictable and manageable, not least to ensure
quick proceedings.

Closing Remarks and Discussion
The ﬁfth and last panel was chaired by Karel
van Miert (Chairman of Nyenrode Institute for
Competition and former European Commissioner
for Competition) who pleaded in favor of a modernization of Article 82 EC which would provide
for “clear and practically enforceable rules.” He
agreed that EC competition law should not protect
inefﬁcient competitors, but added that the great differences in the economic structure of European and
US markets may still justify a different approach to
abuse of dominance cases in the two jurisdictions.
In many cases, protecting competitors means protecting competition (he mentioned in particular the
newly liberalized markets). There may be no scope
for competition at all if small competitors are not
protected in newly liberalized markets.

William Kolasky (partner, Wilmer Cutler
Pickering Hale and Dorr LLP) offered his views
on the notion of competition in the US and how
it affects enforcement policy against dominant
companies. Enforcement in the US is based on
a few clear principles, including the following:
government intervention should be extremely
limited to clearly illegal conduct; rules are not
meant to protect inefﬁcient competitors; and antitrust enforcement should not have the effect of
stiﬂing incentives to compete and to invest. In the
US, two types of conduct are considered abusive:
predation and exclusionary conduct. Courts have
deﬁned very manageable criteria for predation
based on the comparison of prices with average
variable costs (AVC): if price is above AVC they
are per se legal; if they are below AVC, they are
illegal if recoupment is likely. As for exclusionary
conduct, it is abusive if it leads to exclusion of an
equally efﬁcient competitor and if it is likely to
harm consumer welfare by sacriﬁcing short term
proﬁts in order to exclude rivals.
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John Vickers (Chairman, Ofﬁce of Fair Trading) observed that the reform of Article 82 EC will
be challenging because it will have to provide legal
certainty and introduce economic analysis into this
area of law. Those two objectives may not always
be convergent. According to Mr. Vickers, a sound
reform should depart from the current formalistic
approach, which has proved in many cases to be
arbitrary and inconsistent. The reform should be
based on the acknowledgment that there are no per
se abuses and that conduct should be reviewed according to its economic effects. However, he was
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not in favour of an extreme economic approach
which would deprive companies of clear guidance
on what is legal and what is illegal conduct.

* * *
If you have any questions about the reform of
Article 82 EC, please do not hesitate to contact any
of the lawyers listed below:

According to Mr. Vickers, the reform should
clearly deﬁne the object and purpose of Article 82
EC and anchor the enforcement policy to those. He
then discussed the three principles which have been
advanced for helping to determine when a dominant ﬁrm’s conduct is unlawfully exclusionary:
the “sacriﬁce” test (i.e., is the conduct proﬁtable
but for its tendency to eliminate competition?),
the “as-efﬁcient competitor” test (i.e., does the
conduct result in the exclusion of competitors that
are as efﬁcient as the dominant company?) and
the “consumer harm” test (i.e., does the conduct
result in the dominant ﬁrm excluding rivals whose
presence enhances consumer welfare?).

Berlin:
Ulrich Quack
ulrich.quack@wilmerhale.com
Boston:
James C. Burling
james.burling@wilmerhale.com
Brussels:
John Ratliff
john.ratliff@wilmerhale.com

Alberto Pera (Partner, Gianni Origoni Grippo
& Partners) concluded the discussion and the
seminar with the lessons to be learned from the
reform process that had changed the European
Commission’s approach to vertical restraints
under Article 81 EC in recent years. On that
occasion, the need for a reform came from the
“inside”: the European Courts had laid the ground
for the reform in more than one judgment, many
NCAs had already embraced the new approach at
national level, and the business community was
very much in favor of the reform. The reform
of Article 82 EC is very different: the need for
a reform is coming mainly from the business
community who has been very critical vis-à-vis
recent decisions of the European Commission
that have been endorsed by the European
Courts. Regardless of the differences compared
to the reform on vertical restraints, the current
reform of Article 82 EC should learn from that
experience and start the revision process from the
foundations. The key issues that will have to be
tackled include the objectives of Article 82 EC,
the legal rules for achieving such objectives, and
the correct standard of proof.
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Antonio Capobianco
antonio.capobianco@wilmerhale.com
London:
Suyong Kim
suyong.kim@wilmerhale.com
Washington DC:
William J. Kolasky
william.kolasky@wilmerhale.com
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